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On March 17, 2009, President Obama nominated Judge David Hamilton for the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals, the first judicial nomination of his presidency. The New York Times
described Judge Hamilton as “a highly regarded trial court judge … [from] his state’s
traditionally moderate strain,” and stated that he had the support of both home senators, Richard
Lugar (R-IN) and Evan Bayh (D-IN). 1 At the same time, Obama announced that he would
submit potential nominees’ names to the American Bar Association (ABA) for pre-nomination
evaluation, a longstanding tradition with which President Bush dispensed in 2001, stating that he
would permit the ABA to evaluate candidates only after their nominations had been sent to the
Senate. 2
It is difficult to tell what Judge Hamilton’s nomination portends for judicial selection
during President Obama’s administration. 3 Given the president’s background as a law professor
and his keen appreciation of history, he realizes the significance of the judicial appointments he
will make during his time in the White House. It is not certain, however, that he will be able to
fulfill his pledge to “end the confirmation wars.” 4 The President set off a firestorm of protest
1

Lewis, Lewis A. “Moderate Is Said to be Pick for Court.” The New York Times. 17 March 2009: A14,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/politics/17nominate.html?_r=2> (last visited April 14, 2009); United
States, White House Office of the Press Secretary. Press Release. “President Obama Announces David Hamilton for
the United States 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.” 17 March 2009.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-David-Hamilton-for-the-United-States7th-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals/> (last visited April 14, 2009)
2
As discussed in a subsequent section of this paper, in 2001 President Bush advised the ABA that his administration
would no longer send candidates’ names to the organization for pre-nomination evaluation but would allow the
ABA to comment on nominees only after they have been sent to the Senate. Little, Laura E. “The ABA's Role In
Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready To Give Up On The Lawyers?” William and Mary Bill of
Rights Journal 10 (December 2001).
3
An unnamed White House source, however, told Politico: “Don’t expect all Obama judicial nominees to be
moderates.” Gerstein, Josh. “Liberal Judges Coming, Moderate Hamilton Only the First.” Politico, Politico44 blog.
17 March 2009. <http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0309/liberal_judges_coming_95397168-47eb-4d0c97d8-2efb3f835344.html> (last viewed April 14, 2009). This statement contradicts the comment of another
administration official, whom the New York Times quoted as saying that Hamilton “serve[d] ‘as a kind of signal’
about the . . . nominees Mr. Obama will select.” Lewis.
4
Talev, Margaret and Marisa Taylor, “Obama judicial pick will test pledge to end confirmation wars”
KansasCityStar.com. 17 March 2009. <http://www.kansascity.com/444/story/1091897.html> (last visited April 14,
2009). Fletcher, Michael A. “Obama Names Judge to Appeals Court.” Washington Post. A04. 18 March 2009.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2009/03/17/ AR2009031703031. html> (last visited April
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from Republican Senators and conservative interest groups, however, when he suggested that he
would look for nominees who “recognize what it's like to be a young teenage mom” and who
have “empathy to understand what it's like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled
or old.” 5
On March 2, 2009, forty-one Republican Senators wrote the President concerning judicial
nominations. They stated:
We hope your Administration will consult with us as it considers possible nominations to
the federal courts from our states. Regretfully, if we are not consulted on, and approve
of, a nominee from our states, the Republican Conference will be unable to support
moving forward on that nominee. Despite press reports that the Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee now may be considering changing the Committee’s practice of
observing senatorial courtesy, we, as a Conference, expect it to be observed, evenhandedly and regardless of party affiliation. And we will act to preserve this principle
and the rights of our colleagues if it is not. 6
Meanwhile, conservative groups, including the Federalist Society and the Judicial Confirmation
Network, are raising money for a prolonged battle. 7 As an opening salvo, they challenged the
administration’s assertion that Judge Hamilton is a moderate, calling him a “hard-left political
activist,” citing his connection to the ACLU, and decrying rulings that blocked implementation
of an informed consent abortion law. 8 The next round in the “confirmation wars” appears,
therefore, to be well underway.

14, 2009). The term “confirmation wars” was coined by Benjamin Wittes. See Wittes, Benjamin. Confirmation
Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times. Lanam, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
5
Talev and Taylor.
6
Senate Republicans Communications Center. “41 Senate Republicans Send Letter To President Obama Urging
Consultation On Judicial Nominees.” Republicans.Senate.Gov, The Leader Board blog. 2 March 2009.
<http://republican.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=blogs.view&blog_id=3c522434-76e5-448e-9ead1ec214b881ac> (last visited April 14, 2009)
7
Falcone, Michael. “Conservatives Plan Offensive on Obama’s Judicial Nominees.” New York Times, The Caucus:
Politics and Government Blog of the New York Times. 18 November 2008.
<http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/conservatives-plan-offensive-on-obamas-judicial-nominees/> (last
visited April 14, 2009)
8
Brody, David. “Judge Hamilton Under Attack.” CBN.com. 18 March 2009.
<http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/561612.aspx> (last visited April 14, 2009)
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The question is whether anything can be done to break the cycle. For the past twenty
years, there has been a higher degree of contentiousness associated with judicial nominations
than with other types of presidential appointments. 9 This is in part because federal judges have
significant power to enforce or declare invalid laws passed by Congress and by the states. It is in
part the courts have in recent years been the venue where disputes concerning controversial
social issues have played out. Who decides these issues is important because research shows that
“judges from different party affiliations reach distinct legal conclusions on key legal issues . . .
[T]he choice of a judge by a president is an inherently political undertaking, and different
judicial philosophies of constitutional interpretation can lead to vastly different results in judicial
decisions.” 10
Although it is true that judicial selection has inherently political aspects, the highly
contentious manner in which the process presently plays out discourages good candidates from
applying, delays appointments, and creates an undue number of vacancies on the bench,
hampering the judiciary’s ability to resolve cases promptly. 11 It is appropriate to examine,
therefore, whether within the existing constitutional framework, modifications to the selection
process can be made that acknowledge the political aspects of judicial nominations, but also
9

Gerhardt, Michael J. “Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process.” Duke Law Journal 50
(April 2001): 1687, 1708. Ross, William G. “The Senate's Constitutional Role In Confirming Cabinet Nominees
And Other Executive Officers.” Syracuse Law Review 48 (1998): 1123, 1144. Kane, Paul. “Key Agency Nominees
Will Receive Rapid Senate Action; Agreement Does Not Include Judicial Candidates.” Roll Call. 17 September
2001.
10
Wohl, Alexander. “Why Those ‘Other’ Federal Courts are so Important in this Election.” The American Prospect.
30 October 2008. <http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=why_those_other_ federal_courts_are
so_important_in_this_election> (last visited April 14, 2009). Sunstein, Cass R., David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle
Ellman. “Ideological Voting On Federal Courts Of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation.” Virginia Law Review 90
(March 2004): 301. Constitutional Accountability Center, Alliance for Justice, National Resources Defense Council,
Community Rights Council. “Hostile Environment: How Activist Federal Judges threaten our Air, Water and Land.”
July 2001. <http://www.theusconstitution.org/page_module.php?id=10&mid=3> (last visited April 14, 2009)
11
Gerhardt, Michael J. “Judicial Selection as War.” U.C. Davis Law Review 36 (February 2003): 667, 679. Some of
the delay occurs during presidential selection of nominees, while some is attributable to Senatorial consideration of
nominees. Gerhardt concludes that President George W. Bush was able to make nominations more quickly in part
because he eliminated pre-nomination review of candidates by the ABA.
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reduce unnecessary contentiousness, and balance partisan and ideological concerns against other
criteria that are relevant in assessing qualifications for judicial office.
This examination begins with a presentation of data collected concerning judicial
nominations from 1988 through 2008 in an attempt to document the fact that the federal judicial
appointments process has become increasingly contentious. The tables and figures provide
information on measures of contentiousness such as length of time from nomination to
confirmation and vote totals for nominees. After documenting the increasingly contentious
nature of the process, I explore the qualities that make a “good” judge, and federal judicial
selection prior to 1989 to determine whether partisan and ideological considerations have any
relevance in selecting and appointing federal judges. With this information as a backdrop, I then
sample existing selection models, including a recent reform proposal endorsed by the American
Bar Association, to ascertain if they offer insights useful in reshaping the federal judicial
selection process. Finally, I propose procedures on which President Obama and the Senate might
agree to improve the overall climate and reduce the “confirmation wars.”

Data
For at least the past twenty years, Republicans, Democrats, interest groups, legal
organizations and judges have decried rising partisanship and contention in the judicial
appointments process. While there is anecdotal evidence of increased contention, little work has
been done to document its existence. This section sets forth data relevant to measure the level of
contentiousness in the current federal judicial selection process and determine whether, in fact,
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federal judicial appointments have become more contentious in the past twenty years. 12 The
data were obtained from three different sources. First, I reviewed ratings and nominations data
compiled by the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary for
the 101st through the 110th Congresses to identify all nominations made by Presidents George
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. 13 Data from the Federal Judicial Center
confirmed that provided by the ABA; it also provided information regarding judicial
vacancies. 14 The third source of data was Thomas, the Library of Congress online, which
provided information regarding hearing dates, recorded votes and vote types. 15
I gathered data from three sources because the information provided by the Federal
Judicial Center was incomplete, in that it covered only “completed” nominations and did not list
hearings and other pertinent dates. 16 Using these sources, I charted each nominee’s name,
circuit, state, type of judgeship (district, circuit, Supreme Court, DC district court, DC or Federal
Circuit court, Court of International Trade, and territorial courts), date of the vacancy for which
the individual was nominated (where available), date nominated, date of hearing, date on which
the nomination was sent to the Senate floor, date of appointment, ABA rating, Senate vote total,
type of vote (unanimous consent, voice vote, roll call vote), whether the nominee received a
hearing and/or vote, and whether the nominee withdrew from consideration.
I then evaluated the level of contentiousness (dependent variable) using several different
measures – length of time from vacancy to nomination, length of time to hearing or no hearing
12

1988 was chosen as the starting point because anecdotally, many cite the failed nomination of Robert Bork in
1987 as the incident that touched off the “confirmation wars.” Additionally, relevant information is not available
prior to this time.
13
American Bar Association, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. “Ratings of Article III Nominees.”
<http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html> (last visited April 8, 2009)
14
Administrative Office of the Courts, Legislative Affairs Division. “Federal Judicial Vacancies 01/01/1989 –
07/07/08.” Provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, unpublished
15
Thomas, The Library of Congress. “Presidential Nominations.” <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html> (last
visited March 12, 2009)
16
“Completed” nominations refers to nominees who are confirmed by the full Senate.
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before the Senate Judiciary Committee, length of time between hearing and nomination being
sent to the Senate floor or death of nomination in committee, length of time to full Senate vote or
no floor vote, Senate vote total, type of vote (unanimous consent, voice vote, roll call vote),
whether the candidate withdrew, and whether a nomination was completed (i.e. received a vote
on the Senate floor). I considered several independent variables – court type, point in
presidential term and Congress – to determine if some or all of them explained the increase in
contentiousness that had occurred.
I addressed several questions: (1) Do the objective measures identified above show an
increase in the contentiousness of the confirmation process over the past two decades, such that
the number of “contentious” nominations has increased and the percentage of completed
nominations has decreased? (2) Do different factors, such as point in presidential term and
Congress, affect the level of contentiousness? (3) Do factors such as court type, judicial circuit,
or ABA rating, affect levels of contentiousness?

Results and Analysis
This section begins with basic data regarding total nominations between 1989 and 2009.
I next explore the effect on contentiousness of the independent variables I have identified – point
in presidential term, Congress, and court type. Finally, I examine completed nominations, i.e.
those nominees that received a vote, by court type, point in presidential term and Congress.

Numbers of Nominations
To provide a foundation for interpreting the impact of the various independent variables
on levels of contentiousness, it is necessary to understand the total number of nominations made
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during each President’s term and each Congress by court type. Table 1 shows the total number
of nominations made between 1989 and 2009, by presidential term as well as by session of
Congress. It reflects that total nominations remained relatively constant across presidencies,
averaging 245.5 each term. It also shows that there was no discernible pattern of increase or
decrease in nominations between the first and second Congress in a particular president’s term.
Table 1 – Total Nominations by Presidential Term and Congress

George H.W. Bush
Term I
Bill Clinton Term I
Bill Clinton Term II

Total Nominations
253
257
238

Congress
101st Congress
102nd Congress
103rd Congress
104th Congress
105th Congress
106th Congress
107th Congress
108th Congress
109th Congress
110th Congress

Total Nominations
75
178
143
114
120
118
133
134
110
102

George W. Bush Term 267
I
George W. Bush Term 212
II
1226 a
Total
a
There is a small discrepancy – 1226 vs. 1229 – in the total number of nominations reported by
the data sources. I have used 1226 as the total nominations number throughout for consistency.
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, Federal Judicial Center and Thomas

Table 2 demonstrates the total number of nominations made in each presidential term,
controlling for court type. While the number of judges nominated to some courts – e.g., the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit – is too low to permit statistical analysis, these courts
remain important because of their relative power and prestige. 17 The difference in numbers of
nominations per court type is large, but easily explained, as there are many more district

17

The contentiousness evident in the Senate’s consideration of Supreme Court nominations, which garner the most
press coverage and public attention, is discussed below.
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judgeships (678) than circuit or Supreme Court positions. 18 Additionally, the number of
vacancies that occur at any level of court during a particular presidential term is a function of the
number of sitting judges who elect to take senior status or retire during the term and/or of new
judgeships created by Congress during the term.
Table 2 – Total Nominations by Court Type and Presidential Term
Bush I
195
45
7

Clinton I
206
39
4

Clinton II
169
57
5

W. Bush I
202
51
8

W. Bush II
141
58
5

Total
915
252
31

District Court
Circuit Court
DC/Federal
Circuit Court
2
2
0
0
4
8
Supreme
Court
2
5
7
4
5
26
Other Court a
253
257
238
267
212
1226
Total
a
The category “Other Court” includes appointments to the territorial courts (Puerto Rico, the
Northern Marianas Islands, and Guam) and the Court of International Trade.
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, Federal Judicial Center and Thomas
With these general numbers in mind, I next examine possible measures of
contentiousness to determine what they show regarding the state of the judicial nominations
process.

Vote Type, Hearings and Withdrawals

One possible indicator of increased contentiousness in the nominations process is the type
of vote nominees received in the Senate. I thus compiled data to determine the number of
18

Congress authorizes judgeships for each level of court. Since 1869, there have been nine authorized positions on
the Supreme Court. Currently, there are 179 circuit court judgeships and 678 district court judgeships. In 1950,
there were only 65 circuit court judgeships and 212 district court judgeships. It is rare that all judgeships are filled
at any one time; judges die or retire, creating vacancies that remain open until judges are appointed to replace them.
See Federal Judicial Center. “How the Federal Courts Are Organized, Federal judges and how they get appointed.”
<http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu3c&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/A78301
1AF949B6BF85256B35004AD214?opendocument> (last visited April 14, 2009).
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nominees who were confirmed by unanimous consent, voice vote, and roll call vote. For
nominees who did not receive any type of full Senate vote, I examined whether or not they had
received a hearing in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Finally, I determined how many
nominees had withdrawn their names from consideration. Table 3 shows the type of vote
nominees received, whether candidates who did not receive a vote did or did not have a hearing
in the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the number of withdrawn nominations by presidential
term. Table 4 shows the same data by court type.
Table 3 – Vote Types, Hearing, Withdrawn Nominations by Presidential Term

Unanimous
Consent
Voice Vote
Roll Call
Vote
No Hearing,
No Vote
Hearing, No
Vote
Withdrawal

Bush Ia
73.8%

Clinton I
-

Clinton II
-

W. Bush I
-

W. Bush II
-

Total
15.2%

2.8%

79.3%

52.9%

30.7%

28.6%

38.7%

0.8%

2.0%

18.2%

44.6%

28.6%

20.0%

21.8%

11.3%

22.3%

18.9%

25.8%

18.9%

0.8%

5.9%

3.3%

5.1%

11.7%

5.5%

-

1.6%

3.3%

0.7%

5.2%

1.7%

242

296

213

1226

Total
256
Nominations 252
(N)
a
Data is missing for one nomination

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary and Thomas
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Table 4 – Vote Types, Hearings, Withdrawals by Court Type
Unanimous
Consent
15.7%

Voice Vote

Roll Call
Vote
19.0%

No Hearing,
No Vote
16.6%

Hearing, No Withdrawal
Vote
4.1%
1.2%

43.5%
District
Court
14.1%
22.3%
23.0%
27.3%
10.6%
2.7%
Circuit
a
Court
183 (N)
475 (N)
245 (N)
232 (N)
67 (N)
18 (N)
Total
Nominations
a
Because there are so few nominations to the Supreme Court, the territorial courts and the Court
of International Trade, a single controversial nomination in one of these categories would have
an inordinate effect on the averages. As a result, these nominations are not included in the table.
Nominations to the D.C. Circuit and Federal Circuit have been included in the overall averages
for circuit court nominees.
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, Federal Judicial Center and Thomas
As these tables reflect, the Senate has not confirmed judicial candidates by unanimous
consent since the first President Bush’s administration. This is at odds with historical tradition. 19
Additionally, there has been an increasing, although not straight line, trend toward roll call votes
for all nominees, with circuit court nominees more likely to receive a roll call vote than district
court nominees. There is no discernible upward trend in the percentage of nominees not
receiving a hearing or not receiving a vote after being sent to the Senate floor. What is clear,
however, is that a far greater number of circuit court nominees fell into these categories than
district court nominees.

Vote Averages
Another potential measure of the level of contentiousness in the confirmation process is
the average vote total nominees have received. To measure this across the study period, I
19

Historically, “roll call votes have been reserved for opposed nominations,” while unanimous consent was the
“norm.” Hatch, Orrin B. “Judicial Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure.” Utah Law Review 2005 (2005): 803,
824.
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removed data on nominees who did not receive a vote and then averaged vote totals by president
and type of court. Nominees who were confirmed by unanimous consent or voice vote were
coded as a vote of 100.
As noted, the number of nominees receiving a roll call vote has grown across all court
types. The percentage of candidates who received roll call votes moved from a low of 0.8%
during President George H.W. Bush’s first term to a high of 44.6% during his son’s first term.
Average vote totals declined in inverse proportion to this increase. Candidates confirmed by roll
call vote generally received between 50 and 90 affirmative votes while candidates confirmed via
unanimous consent or voice vote received 95 to 100 votes. Thus, while the absolute decrease in
average vote totals is small, and appears statistically insignificant, it reflects an increase in
contested, roll call votes, and thus an increase in contentiousness.
Table 5 shows average vote totals by court type and presidential term. As can be seen,
averages for both the district and circuit courts have decreased over the past two decades, from a
high of 99.80 during President George H.W. Bush’s first term to a low of 94.39 during his son’s
second term. Vote totals for circuit court nominees declined steadily over the study period,
while there was a slight uptick in the district court average during President George W. Bush’s
second term. Despite this slight increase, district court averages overall have declined since the
first President Bush left office.
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Table 5 – Vote Averages by Presidential Term and Court Type

District Court

Bush I
100.00

Clinton I
100.00

Clinton II
97.36

W. Bush I
95.50

W. Bush II
97.30

Average
98.27

Circuit Courta

99.09

97.63

92.05

90.79

84.43

93.45

Average

99.80

99.63

96.25

94.74

94.39

97.35

a

Nominations to the Supreme Court, the territorial courts and the Court of International Trade
are not included, and nominations to the D.C. and Federal Circuit Courts have been included in
the overall averages for circuit court nominees.
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from Federal Judicial Center and Thomas.
Standing alone, average vote totals suggest minimal increase in the contentiousness of the
nominations process. Coupled with the data on roll call votes, which is most probably the cause
of the decrease in vote totals, however, the average vote totals are a more meaningful indicator of
increased contentiousness.

Wait Time Averages
A common theme in the scholarly literature regarding the contentiousness of the judicial
selection process is the increasing amount of time that separates nomination and confirmation. 20
To measure this phenomenon, I looked not only at overall wait time, but separated wait time into
three segments for all completed nominations. 21 I also analyzed wait times by presidential term
and type of court. The tables show an increase in wait times from the years that President
George H.W. Bush was in office to the time his son became president. This is true for all stages
of the nomination process – nomination to hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
20

See Goldman, Sheldon. “Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology And The Battle For The Federal Courts.”
University of Richmond Law Review 39 (Mar. 2005): 871, 893-94. Goldman, Sheldon. “Assessing The Senate
Judicial Confirmation Process: The Index of Obstruction And Delay.” Judicature 86 (March-April 2003): 251, 25256
21
I restricted the measurement to completed nominations because they are the only nominations for which there is
accurate and complete data; for nominees who did not receive a vote, the data is frequently incomplete.
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hearing to vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee, and committee vote to confirmation by the
full Senate. Nominees during President Clinton’s second term experienced the longest wait
times, and wait times decreased once President George W. Bush took office. Nonetheless, wait
times under George W. Bush remained well above what they had been during his father’s
administration and President Clinton’s first term.
Table 6 – Average Wait Times in Days (Nomination to Hearing, Hearing to Sent to
Floor, Sent to Floor to Appointment, and Total Wait Time) by Presidential Term
Bush I
Clinton I
Clinton II
W. Bush I
W. Bush II Average
63.16
110.12
91.58
102.13
81.54
Nomination 73.28
(N=194)
(N=201)
(N=166)
(N=209)
(N=91)
(N=865)
to Hearing
17.59
13.64
14.29
23.52
21.23
17.92
Hearing to
(N=195)
(N=199)
(N=166)
(N=204)
(N=86)
(N=853)
Sent
4.80
15.79
33.90
34.92
20.02
22.16
Sent to
(N=196)
(N=209)
(N=172)
(N=204)
(N=94)
(N=892)
Appoint
95.64
94.51
163.99
147.27
131.14
121.06
Total Wait
(N=195)
(N=211)
(N=172)
(N=209)
(N=99)
(N=904)
Time
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary and Thomas
To better understand the data shown in Table 6, it is useful to separate wait times between
district and circuit court nominees. With the sole exception of President George H.W. Bush’s
administration, Table 7 shows that there was a longer overall wait time for circuit court than for
district court nominees.
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Table 7 – Average Wait Times in Days (Nomination to Hearing, Hearing to Sent to
Floor, Sent to Floor and Appointment, and Total Wait Time) by Court Type
Nomination
Hearing to
Sent to
Total Wait
To Hearing
Sent
Appoint
Time
George H.W.
95.84 (N=148)
District Court 76.36 (N=147) 15.79 (N=147) 3.79 (N=148)
Bush Term I
16.35 (N=35)
9.03 (N=35)
94.32 (N=35)
Circuit Court 68.94 (N=35)
Bill Clinton
District Court 61.68 (N=156) 12.79 (N=155) 15.37 (N=164) 91.88 (N=165)
Term I
14.22 (N=28)
21.57 (N=29)
113.39 (N=29)
Circuit Court 74.70 (N=28)
Bill Clinton
District Court 105.74 N=130) 13.74 (N=130) 36.65 (N=132) 155.18 (N=132)
Term II
9.13 (N=33)
166.94 (N=33)
Circuit Court 140.77 (N=32) 16.19 (N=32)
George W. Bush District Court 82.57 (N=169) 24.09 (N=165) 31.51 (N=165) 137.55 (N=169)
Term I
35.87 (N=32)
200.88 (N=33)
Circuit Court 142.25 (N=33) 24.35 (N=32)
George W. Bush District Court 103.08 (N=90) 19.00 (N=89)
23.05 (N=104) 132.49 (N=105)
Term II
31.00 (N=14)
24.05 (N=21)
138.91 (N=24)
Circuit Court 96.00 (N=17)
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary and Thomas

Completion Rate
Another possible indicator of contentiousness in the confirmation process is the nominee
completion rate, i.e., the percentage of a president’s nominees who received a vote. I determined
this rate by comparing total nominations receiving a vote with total nominations. This
information is depicted in Table 8. Overall completed nominations data shows that the
percentage of nominees receiving a vote by the full Senate has remained roughly comparable
across presidencies, with the exception of President George W. Bush’s second term, when the
number fell precipitously from the 70% range to 49.19%. This is most probably a function of
President Bush’s low approval rating, the fact that the Democrats controlled Congress for two
years of the term, and the belief that his nominees were, on the whole, more ideologically
extreme than those of other presidents. Given the rough comparability of the Clinton, George
H.W. Bush and first George W. Bush terms, however, nomination completion appears to be the
least reliable of the measures of contentiousness tested.
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Table 8 – Completed Nominations by Presidential Term
Total Nominations

Nominations
Receiving Vote
253
195
Bush I
257
208
Clinton I
238
173
Clinton II
267
208
W. Bush I
122
W. Bush II 212
1227
906
Total
a
This includes withdrawn nominations.

Nominations Receiving
“No Action”a
59
49
66
60
126
321

Completed
Nominations (%)
76.68%
80.93%
72.27%
77.90%
49.19%
73.84%

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary and Thomas
Table 9 breaks down completed nominations by court type. The analytically important
distinction is the one between completed nominations at the district and circuit court levels.
District court nominees had a completion rate of 77.92% versus 59.13% for circuit court
nominees. This 18.79% difference is evidence of the fact that circuit court nominations are more
contentious than district court nominations as a group.
Table 9 – Completion Rate by Court Type
Total
Nominations
Nominations Receiving Completed
Nominations
Receiving Vote
“No Action”
Nominations (%)
915
713
202
77.92%
District Court
283
168
115
59.36%
Circuit Courta
1198
881
317
73.54%
Total
a
Nominations to the Supreme Court, the territorial courts and the Court of International Trade
are not included, and nominations to the D.C. and Federal Circuit Courts have been included in
the overall averages for circuit court nominees
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary and Thomas
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Overall Contentiousness
Overall, a majority of the measures of contentiousness tested – average vote totals,
average wait times, and vote types – show increasing contentiousness in the nominations
process. Other measures, such as hearing vs. no hearing and completed nominations, show that
circuit nominations are substantially more contentiousness than district court nominations.
Figure 1 combines the measures tested to show an overall increase in contentiousness.
Figure 1 – Vote Types, Hearings, and Withdrawals

The data showing that circuit court nominations are more contentious than district court
nominations is consistent with anecdotal information and reflects the more important role that
circuit courts play in formulating law nationwide. The data – particularly average vote totals,
vote type, and wait times – also show increasing contention at the district court level, however.
This is analytically important, as district court nominations were historically thought to be noncontroversial. The increase in contentiousness at this level suggests an increase in the
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contentiousness of the confirmation process overall from President George H.W. Bush’s time in
office to the conclusion of his son’s second term.
To chart the shift that has occurred over the last two decades, I defined a “contentious
nomination” as one in which the nominee received less than 90 votes, had a longer wait time by
50 days more than the average for the presidential term in which the nomination was made, or
withdrew or received “no action” on the nomination. These measures demonstrate contention
because (1) 50 days is approximately half again as long as the longest wait time between
nomination and hearing in the last twenty years, which is the portion of the nominations process
that typically results in the greatest delay; (2) 90 votes is both below the overall average and far
enough below 100 to reflect real opposition to a nomination; and (3) the fact the Senate took “no
action” or a candidate withdrew is a clear sign that the nomination was contentious. Table 10
shows the number of “contentious” nominations utilizing this definition by presidential term and
Congress.
Table 10 – Number of Contentious Nominations by Presidential term and Congress
Congress

Total
Contentious
Term Overall
Nominations Nominations
st
75
10.67%
33.60%
George H.W. 101 Congress
nd
178
43.26%
Bush Term I 102 Congress
rd
143
20.28%
34.24%
Bill Clinton 103 Congress
th
Term I 104 Congress
114
51.75%
th
120
50.00%
52.52%
Bill Clinton 105 Congress
th
Term II 106 Congress
118
55.08%
th
Congress
133
47.37%
49.44%
107
George W.
th
134
51.49%
Bush Term I 108 Congress
th
111
70.27%
62.10%
George W. 109 Congress
Bush Term II 110th Congress
137
55.47%
101-110th Congress
1226
47.63%
Total
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from data gathered from ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, Federal Judicial Center and Thomas
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As this table demonstrates, commencing with President Clinton’s second term, the
number of contentious nominations increased and remained high. In George H.W. Bush’s
administration, 85 judicial nominations, or 33.60%, were contentious. During President
Clinton’s first term, there was a slight uptick in this number. In Clinton’s second term, however,
there were 125 contentious nominations, or 52.52% of the total. The percentage declined
slightly during President George W. Bush’s first term to 49.44% (139 nominations), but
increased again during his second term. In that four year span, there were 154 contentious
nominations, or 62.10% of the total. Measured by average vote totals, average wait times, and
“no action” nominations, therefore, federal judicial selection has grown increasingly contentious.
Figure 2 demonstrates the rise in contentious nominations from George H.W. Bush’s
administration to his son’s second term.
Figure 2 – Contentious Nominations by Congress

The increase in contention is also demonstrated by differences in the processing of
district and circuit court nominations. Measured by average vote totals, average wait times, and
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“no action” nominations, circuit court nominations were consistently more contentious than
district court nominations during the study period. The gap between the two, which had ranged
from 10% to 25%, widened considerably during President Clinton’s second term, growing to
42.43% during the 106th Congress. 22 The differential remained high during the first two years of
President George W. Bush’s first term (at 37.48%) before skyrocketing to 48.51% in the last two
years of that term. During President Bush’s second term, when the overall level of contentious
nominations reached an all-time high, the gap between contentious district and circuit court
nominations returned to historic levels, at 16% to 27%. Figure 3 depicts this information.
Figure 3 – Contentious Nominations by Congress, District and Appellate Courts

In sum, the data support anecdotal views in the literature and elsewhere that the
nominations process at every court level has become increasingly more contentious between
1989 and 2009. Many observers attribute this trend to an inappropriate emphasis on the
ideology of judicial nominees that began with the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the
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In that two year period, 42.86% of district court nominations were contentious vs. 85.29% of circuit court
nominations.
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Supreme Court. 23 This explanation is too simplistic, as I detail below. Because “ideology” has
become the focal point of debate over contentiousness in the judicial nominations process,
however, I examine what criteria are properly taken into account from both a constitutional and
an historical perspective before exploring more fully the reasons for the heightened level of
contention surrounding the confirmation federal judges.

The Characteristics of a “Good Judge”
Having documented an increase in contentiousness in the federal judicial selection
process, it is appropriate to ask whether the trend matters. If the contentiousness of the process
has had an impact on the quality of the federal bench – e.g., discouraged highly qualified
candidates from applying and/or resulted in the appointment of unqualified individuals – then it
is clearly a trend that should be reversed. To explore whether there has been this type of
detrimental impact, however, it is first necessary to examine whether there is an agreed definition
of “qualifications” for judicial office, and whether partisan or ideological views properly form
any part of the definition.
The Constitution does not set forth the qualifications that those seeking judicial office
must have. In Federalist No. 78, however, Hamilton argued that intellectual ability, legal
knowledge, and impeccable ethics were the measure of a judicial candidate’s “merit.” As
Hamilton put it:
[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to
qualify them for the stations of judges, and making the proper deductions for the ordinary
depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the
requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. 24
23

Wermiel, Stephen J. “Confirming The Constitution: The Role Of The Senate Judiciary Committee,” Law and
Contemporary Problems 56 (Autumn 1993): 121, 130-31
24
Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 78.” 28 May 1788. <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm> (last
visited April 14, 2009)
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In a later Federalist paper, Hamilton contrasted these qualities with the attributes he anticipated
would be emblematic of legislators. He observed that legislators would “rarely be chosen with a
view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges,” given their “natural
propensity to party divisions” and the “habit” of “marshal[ling themselves] on opposite sides” of
an issue. 25 Hamilton believed that integrity and legal knowledge, coupled with a lifetime
appointment, would ensure an independent judiciary that would not be unduly swayed by public
opinion, would apply the law impartially, and would protect the rights of the minority against the
tyranny of the majority. 26 Given the manner in which he contrasted the qualities of a judge and
the qualities of a legislator, moreover, he appears to have believed that partisan affiliation and
ideology were not relevant in assessing an individual’s qualifications for judicial appointment.
Hamilton’s view was at odds with the views of our earliest presidents – Washington and
Adams – who saw membership in the Federalist Party as the most important qualification for
judicial office. 27 The fact that they considered partisan affiliation in selecting judges, however,
does not mean that they eschewed the “baseline” qualities identified by Hamilton or that they
appointed judges who were not qualified in terms of legal knowledge and integrity. 28
Indeed, it is generally agreed that legal knowledge, the ability to apply the law to the facts
of a particular case, and ethics and integrity in doing so are fundamental qualifications that an
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Law Review 101 (Spring 1999): 495, 500
28
Marcus, Maeva. “Federal Judicial Selection: The First Decade,” University of Richmond Law Review 39 (March
2005): 797, 808. Harris, Joseph P. “The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of
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individual must have to secure appointment to the bench. 29 Other relatively non-controversial
characteristics that most believe judges should possess are good judicial temperament, and
neutrality or even-handedness. 30 The American Judicature Society has defined judicial
temperament as
a variety of noble qualities. One of these qualities is dignity. To be dignified a judge
must possess “quiet, tactful ways, and calm yet firm assurance.” A jurist with
appropriate judicial temperament uses authority gracefully. Judicial temperament also
requires sensitivity and understanding. An understanding judge is sensitive to the
feelings of those before the court, recognizing that each and every case is important to
participants. Finally, a candidate is not temperamentally suited for the bench unless he or
she possesses great patience. Patience is simply the ability to be even-tempered and to
exercise restraint in trying situations. 31
While definitions vary, and proper judicial temperament is often in the eye of the
beholder, 32 most agree that it encompasses the ability to be courteous, civil, sensitive, and
patient. Most also agree that it requires a “personality free from arrogance.” 33
Prior legal or judicial experience is also generally viewed as a necessary qualification for
appointment to judicial office. Many states require, and the ABA advocates, that judicial
candidates have a minimum number of years in practice or on the bench.34 At least in the
modern era, however, prior legal experience has not been deemed sufficient for appointment to
the appellate bench. Prior judicial experience has been the norm for nominees to the Supreme
29

Goldman, Sheldon. “Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a ‘Good’ Judge.” Annals of the American
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<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1044995> (last visited August 20, 2008). American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence. “Standards On State Judicial Selection (2000).”
<http://www.abanet.org/judind/downloads/reformat.pdf> (last visited March 15, 2009). Solum, Lawrence B. “The
Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection.” Southern California Law Review 61
(September 1988): 1735, 1740
30
Goldman 112-124. Standards on State Judicial Selection. Symposium, “Appointment Versus Election: Balancing
Independence And Accountability.” University of Toledo Law Review 33 (Winter 2002): 287, 300
31
Greenstein, Maria N. American Judicature Society. “Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners.”
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32
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Court, 35 and the same is increasingly true for appointment to the Courts of Appeal. 36 Chief
Justice Rehnquist decried this trend, noting the likely result that U.S. courts would “too much
resemble the judiciary in civil law countries,” where jurists are career civil servants who “simply
do not command the respect and enjoy the independence of our[ ]” courts. 37 Nonetheless, it
appears that prior judicial experience is considered, if not an absolute prerequisite to an appellate
court appointment, at a minimum a strong qualification.
Having defined the generally agreed characteristics that “qualify” an individual for
judicial office, it is appropriate to turn to the disputed criteria: ideology and partisan affiliation. 38
As discussed in a later section of this paper, the Constitution created an inherently political
process for the selection and appointment of federal judges by failing to delineate the criteria on
which nominees were to be evaluated, and by requiring that the Senate consent to the
appointment of all nominees selected by the president. Consequently, while ideology and
partisan affiliation are not “qualifications” for judicial office in the traditional sense of the word,
they are most certainly attributes that are properly taken into account under the constitutional
framework governing judicial appointments in this country. 39 While there is disagreement as to
whether ideology and partisan affiliation should be given the same weight as, or less weight than,
legal knowledge, experience, temperament and integrity in the evaluation process, one or both
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are, directly or indirectly, and to greater or lesser degree, components of the relevant judicial
selection models studied. Consequently, it is appropriate to include them in the definition of
“judicial qualifications” when evaluating the current state of the judicial confirmation process.
This conclusion is supported when one considers how the Founders viewed judicial
selection, and how presidents and Senates have exercised their respective constitutional powers
in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Judicial Selection Prior to 1989
The process used to select federal judges today is a product of early decisions made by
delegates to the Constitution Convention. They debated not only the structure of the federal
courts but how federal judges would be selected and how long their tenure would be. 40
Ultimately, they agreed that the President would appoint judges with the “advice and consent” of
the Senate and that, once appointed, they would have life tenure. 41 The delegates did not
undertake to outline the qualifications candidates for judicial office would be expected to meet,
however, nor detail the criteria the Senate was to use in consenting, or declining to consent to, a
president’s nominees. By dividing responsibility between the president and Senate, and
remaining silent on the criteria to be used in evaluating judicial nominees, the delegates invited
interpretation by generations of presidents and Senators from a partisan political perspective.
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention debated four main proposals regarding
judicial selection: legislative appointment (by both houses of Congress); executive appointment;
40
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Senate appointment; and executive appointment with the “advice and consent” of the Senate. 42
Selection Model

Explanation and History

Legislative Appointment

Edmund Randolph recommended the Virginia Plan, which proposed that
judges “be chosen by the national legislature.” 43 Others, like John
Rutledge, supported legislative appointment because he worried that
allowing the executive to appoint judges might ultimately lead to a
monarchy. 44

Executive Appointment

James Wilson of Pennsylvania recommended executive appointment of
judges because “experience [showed] the impropriety of [allowing] such
appointments [to be made] by numerous bodies.” Executive appointment
was incorporated as part of the New Jersey Plan proposed by William
Patterson. 45

Senate Appointment

James Madison recommended that the Senate appoint judges as a
compromise to a proposal for selection of judges by both the House and
Senate. Madison feared that the involvement of both houses would lead
to disproportionate appointment of former legislators and persons who
had done political favors for legislators. 46

Advice and Consent

Nathaniel Gorham proposed a compromise to Senate appointment, as he
felt that “even that branch [was] too numerous” to ensure unbiased
appointments. Gorham’s compromise was to have the executive appoint
judges with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47
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Unable to agree on the proper method of appointing judges, the delegates referred the
matter to the Committee of Detail. 48 The first draft of the Constitution written by the Committee
of Detail contemplated Senate appointment of Supreme Court judges, but left appointment of
“officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution,” including judges of the
inferior courts, to the President. 49 Ultimately, the delegates did not adopt this proposal, and
elected to have all judges appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.
They favored this model because it created built-in checks and balances by “blending a branch of
the Legislature with the Executive.” 50
The model the delegates adopted reflects their central focus on the relationship between
the executive and legislative branches. 51 It also reflects their anticipation that the political
system implemented in the United States would not be partisan or contentious. 52 Quite quickly,
this latter assumption proved to be untrue, and the delegates’ adoption of a judicial selection
process that divided power between the President and the Senate introduced partisanship and
ideology into nomination decisions. As one scholar has put it, “[f]rom the earliest days [of the
Republic], episodic controversy over ideology and partisanship came into play over federal
judicial appointments.” 53
Reviewing the history of judicial appointments in America, Sheldon Goldman has
identified four motivations that have driven presidents when nominating judges: a desire to
advance the substantive goals of their administration (a “policy agenda”); an effort to build
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political support for themselves or their party (a “partisan agenda”); a wish to reward personal
friends or associates (a “personal agenda”); or some combination of these. 54 While Goldman’s
construct is analytically appealing, contrary to his assumption, historically presidents’ policy and
partisan agendas have merged, as presidents assume that members of their party are ideologically
attuned to their policy views. 55 Personal motivations, moreover, have played a lesser role than
partisan and policy goals, at least in lower court appointments, as most nominees have not been
personally known to or associated with the appointing president. What emerges from an
historical review of judicial appointments, in fact, is the conclusion that ideology and
partisanship have been firmly ensconced as a part of the process from the beginning.
The earliest presidents, Washington and John Adams “packed the Supreme Court with
tried and true [members of the] Federalist[ ]” party. 56 When Thomas Jefferson, a Republican,
was elected to succeed Adams, the Federalist Congress created a slew of new judgeships and
filled them with Federalists on the eve of ceding power. Once installed, the Democratic
Congress prevented the Supreme Court from sitting for more than a year, and abolished many of
the newly created judgeships. 57 During this era, “Senatorial consideration of a nominee’s
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politics,” rather than deference to the president or concern for the nominee’s qualifications, was
the primary criterion used to evaluate judicial nominees. 58
The pattern established in these early years continued as the Republic matured. 59 In the
nineteenth century, “party affiliation increasingly became a useful proxy [for] . . . a nominee’s
loyalty to a president’s (or key senator’s) preferred constitutional ideology and policy views.” 60
Faced with the prospect of civil war, for example, Abraham Lincoln used judicial appointments
as a form of “patronage to [consolidate] party [support]” and as a means of “further[ing] his
policy initiatives” and “domestic agenda.” 61
In the early twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt was interested in “shaping the
direction of the federal bench” and, like others before him, focused on nominees’ ideology as a
result. 62 Little changed as the twentieth century progressed. Although initially Franklin
Roosevelt viewed judicial appointments as an opportunity to curry political favor or reward a
political operative or friend, his focus shifted after the courts struck down important pieces of
New Deal legislation. After many years of Republican administrations, “almost three-fourths of
lower court federal judges were Republicans.” 63 Roosevelt felt he needed to change the
ideological direction of the bench in order to protect his legislative achievements and thus began
58
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to look for appointees whose views were “compatib[le] with [his] economic and social-welfare
policy agenda.” 64
Because Roosevelt packed the courts with judges willing to uphold the New Deal, 65
Harry Truman was able to focus less on policy concerns and more on strictly patronage
appointments. 66 Although Truman thought that his selections were partisan rather than
ideological, he faced a Republican majority in the Senate after the 1946 mid-term elections,
which equated ideology with partisan affiliation and viewed his selections as ideological. To
limit the president’s ability to appoint “leftists, . . . New Dealers, . . . women and blacks,”
Republican Senator Richard Wiley asked the ABA to evaluate the president’s judicial
nominees. 67
Previously, there had been little pushback by the Senate to judicial nominations driven by
ideological or partisan concerns, since, for the most part, the same party controlled both the
presidency and the Senate. With Truman, however, it is possible to discern the seeds of the
contentiousness that partisan or ideological appointments have generated in more recent eras of
divided government. Between 1946 and 1947, the number of district and circuit judges
confirmed by the Republican-controlled Senate dropped from sixteen to ten. 68 In 1948, only two
district judges and one circuit judge were confirmed. 69 After Democrats regained control of the
Senate in 1948, these numbers jumped dramatically; during the next two years, sixty-three
district and circuit court judges were approved. 70
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When President Eisenhower was elected in 1952, Republicans retook the Senate. By
1955, however, and through the balance of his term, Eisenhower faced a Democratic Senate.
Perhaps for this reason, Eisenhower wanted judges who were noncontroversial and “whose
views ‘reflect[ed] a middle-of-the-road political and governmental philosophy.’” 71 As a result,
he focused on ensuring “that his appointees [were] of high quality and [met] the approval of the
ABA.” 72
The one twentieth century president whose approach to judicial appointments appears to
be somewhat anomalous is Jimmy Carter. Although he had a Democratic majority in the Senate,
President Carter sought to reduce partisanship in the judicial nominating process by establishing
the United States Circuit Court Judge Nominating Commission in 1977, and charging it with
recommending candidates for circuit judgeships. 73 He also “encourag[ed] Senators to establish
local merit-based commissions to select federal district court judges whenever vacancies
occurred in their home states.” 74
The adoption of a less partisan approach to judicial nominations was short-lived.
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When Ronald Reagan was elected, he “saw the federal courts as frustrating [his] policy
agenda…,” 75 and made it a priority to change “politically liberal judicial policy by changing the
judges.” 76 He sought out candidates “who believed in ‘judicial restraint,’” and who would be
sympathetic to his policy positions. 77 Reagan also changed the process by which judicial
nominees were selected in an effort to increase focus on the nominees’ ideology. In prior
administrations, the Department of Justice had screened and recommended nominees for
appointment. President Reagan moved the process of identifying and vetting nominees into the
White House. 78
As this brief survey suggests, ideology and partisanship have been part of the judicial
selection process, to a greater or lesser degree, since the earliest days of the Republic. For the
most part, use of partisan or ideological criteria to select nominees has not generated significant
controversy or contention because presidents have sent their nominations to Senates controlled
by members of their own party. When this has not been the case, however – e.g., during the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations – presidents either moderated the role of ideology and
party in appointments, or saw the number of judges they were able to confirm drop precipitously.
The only exception to the historical trend appears to be Jimmy Carter. Although the Senate was
in Democratic hands during the Carter administration, he attempted – unsuccessfully in the long
run – to reduce the emphasis on partisan and ideological concerns and to elevate consideration of
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qualifications such as legal knowledge, temperament and integrity. Even this approach,
however, was in aid of a policy agenda. 79 The merit commissions Carter appointed were stocked
with Democratic activists. 80 The pattern of judicial selection prior to 1988 suggests, therefore,
that attempting to eliminate partisan and ideological concerns entirely from the confirmation
process would be both unwarranted and futile.

The Causes of Contentiousness
As the preceding history demonstrates, partisanship in federal judicial appointments is
not a new phenomenon. What has changed, however, as reflected in the data, is the
contentiousness of the confirmation process. Supreme Court nominations have been a point of
contention since the beginning of the Republic. Judith Resnik, a well-known judicial
appointments scholar, cites the fight over Washington’s nomination of John Rutledge as Chief
Justice as evidence of this fact. 81
Over the course of the nation’s history, the Senate has rejected twelve Supreme Court
nominees and defeated fourteen others through delay. 82 Twenty of these twenty-six nominations
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were put forward prior to 1896. 83 Of the remaining six, “five have come since 1968.”84 Writing
in 1999, Richard Freer, a law professor at Emory University, stated: “[E]ven successful
[Supreme Court] nominations have been increasingly contentious: of the past fifteen nominations
to the Supreme Court, the Senate has rejected three; and seven confirmations over that span have
generated at least twenty-five negative votes in the Senate.” 85
Freer attributes the increased contentiousness in recent times at least in part to divided
government, noting that “[f]rom 1896 until 1969, only two Presidents – Truman and Eisenhower
– faced a Senate in opposition hands. Since then, however, every President except Carter . . . has
faced opposition Senates for at least part of his tenure.” 86 Indeed, it is clear from Fiorina’s work
on divided government that one of its consequence is an increase in the percentage of
unconfirmed presidential appointees overall; as reflected in the data, judicial appointments are
simply one part of this trend. 87
Freer asserts that it was the nomination of Abe Fortas by President Johnson in 1968 that
ushered in a new era in Supreme Court nominations. He posits that, certain they would win the
White House in the upcoming election, Republicans wanted to stall the Fortas nomination, and
raised issues both about Fortas’ financial dealings and about his judicial philosophy. 88 Their
tactics were successful and President Johnson ultimately withdrew the Fortas nomination; after
Richard Nixon was elected, he nominated Warren Burger, who was easily confirmed. 89 Fortas
remained on the Supreme Court but was ultimately forced to resign based on alleged ethical
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violations. 90 At this point, Democrats vowed to retaliate and did so when considering President
Nixon’s subsequent nominations of Judges Haynsworth and Carswell. 91
If the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations were pay-back for Fortas, the nomination
battle that really marks the beginning of the modern day “confirmation wars” is that of Judge
Robert Bork. President Reagan had made clear his desire to transform the ideological make-up
of the federal courts; Judge Bork was viewed as a staunch conservative.92 At the time he was
nominated, Democrats had gained control of the Senate. 93 Given President Reagan’s earlier
appointment of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, and Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice, the
Bork nomination represented a tipping point in terms of future control of the Court. 94 Thus,
Democrats vigorously opposed his confirmation on ideological grounds.95 The report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee recommending rejection of the nomination praised Judge Bork as an
academic and legal scholar and said explicitly that “[t]he central issue” surrounding his
confirmation was his “judicial philosophy.” 96 Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), who opposed the
nomination, took pains to state that he did not question Judge Bork’s integrity or honesty, and
made it clear that his no vote was based on Bork’s judicial philosophy and views. 97 The
minority report decried the majority’s focus on Judge Bork’s ideology, and noted – presciently –
that the majority’s approach would “see the judiciary have its independence threatened by
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activist special interest groups.” 98 Bork’s nomination was ultimately rejected by a vote of 52 to
48. 99
The vote provoked outrage and controversy. Noted conservative columnist William
Safire coined a new verb – to “bork,” meaning “[to] attack viciously a candidate or appointee,
especially by misrepresentation in the media.” 100 Judge Bork wrote a book attacking the
Senate’s focus on political philosophy as improper. 101 Although, as has been noted, ideology
had long played a role in the confirmation process, Bork’s nomination was unusual in the sense
that ideology was the sole reason given for rejecting his nomination. No attempt was made to
couch ideological opposition in the guise of concerns about qualifications, conflict of interest or
other more politically neutral issues. 102 For this reason, some have argued that Judge Bork’s
nomination “departed from what was then the norm,” and “established a new norm for
confirmation hearings.” 103
Perhaps more importantly, the Bork nomination marked the beginning of a heightened
role for interest groups in the judicial nominations process. 104 By the time President Clinton
took office, interest groups had expanded their involvement in the nominations process from the
Supreme Court to include the lower courts as well. Professor Nancy Scherer reports that
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organized interest groups did not oppose a single lower court nominee between 1933 and 1972;
between 2001 and 2004, by contrast, they publicly opposed thirty nominees. 105
Interest groups’ most important impact on the confirmation process, however, has come
about not through formal participation at Judiciary Committee hearings, but through informal,
indirect efforts to influence Senators. These include disseminating information regarding a
candidate to constituents in the hope that they will communicate their views to their Senators;
organizing grassroots efforts for or against particular nominees (e.g., letter writing and email
campaigns); and directly lobbying Senators to vote yea or nay on particular nominations. 106
According to Professor Scherer, the interest groups’ involvement reflects the fact that
lower court judgeships, which were traditionally patronage appointments by individual senators,
have become “a means [of] satisfy[ing] the activists’ policy demands. 107 For this reason,
Scherer asserts, interest group participation in the judicial confirmation process has become an
“elite mobilization strategy.” 108 In this era when party bosses are a thing of the past, candidates
use activists, who are not beholden to either political party, to mobilize voters, secure election
and stay in office. 109 Activists care about who is appointed to the courts, Scherer asserts,
because the courts have changed “from [being] … closed institution[s] that [decided] the
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property and business-oriented claims of corporations into . . . open institution[s] that [decide
the] individual rights claims of the disadvantaged.” 110 This view is shared by others.

In his book, Confirmation Wars, Benjamin Wittes argues that lower court nominations
have become more contentious in part because the courts have increasingly been put in the
position of deciding important issues of social, political and moral policy. 111 Ninth Circuit
Judge Milan Smith echoes this view, observing that, “beginning with the Warren court, and
[continuing] since, judges have been way ahead of the [political] curve on a number of
[issues].” 112 Lower courts, in fact, “today serve as the final arbiter of more than 99 percent of
all federal court litigation” because the Supreme Court grants review in so few cases each
year. 113
While the increasing importance of decisions by the lower federal courts, the greater
involvement of interest groups in the confirmation process, and the use of elite mobilization
strategies by both the president and members of the Senate have contributed to the increased
contentiousness of judicial selection, they are but part of the story.
Presidential changes to the process used to identify and vet judicial candidates is a second
important cause of increasing contention. Starting with President Reagan, there has been a trend
toward centralizing power for the selection of judicial nominees in the White House rather than
in the Department of Justice. Historically, judicial selection was the responsibility of the Deputy
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Attorney General’s Office. 114 As political science and law professor David Law noted, however,
“sensitive political activities – namely, those critical to successful execution of the President’s
policy agenda – [must] be conducted by those loyal to the President.” 115 In the case of judicial
nominations, this has been achieved by “centralization,” i.e., “the relocation of sensitive
functions into the White House itself.” 116 While there has by no means been a straight-line
progression, administrations since the time of Richard Nixon have experimented with a variety
of institutional arrangements for selecting judges. Over time, the result has been consolidation of
power in the White House, and a diminished role for the Department of Justice and home state
Senators. 117
Prior to the administration of President Jimmy Carter, home state Senators exercised a
great deal of control over the selection not only of district judge nominees, but of circuit court
judges as well. 118 In the words of Ninth Circuit Judge William Fletcher, nominations in the preCarter era were “controlled by the Senate.” 119 California Judge Carolyn Kuhl agreed, noting that
nominations to both the district and circuit courts traditionally originated outside the White
House with Senators from the appointing state.120 There was a well-entrenched tradition of dealmaking between Senators and Presidents, Judge Fletcher noted, which resembled a patronage
system in some respects, and allowed all players to advance personal and policy agendas. 121 The
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give-and-take of the process naturally reduced the contentiousness of debates over individual
nominations.
By appointing a presidential nominating commission in each circuit, Carter removed
from members of the Senate the sway they had previously had over the selection of circuit court
judges. As Professor Law puts it, “the balance of power [with respect to circuit court
appointments] shifted decisively under Carter and has not been restored since.” 122
Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, cemented control of all nominations, not just circuit
court nominations, in the White House with the creation of a “new joint White House/Justice
Department Judicial Selection Committee” that “included key White House staff persons as well
as the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General” for the
Office of Legal Policy. 123 While the committee included members of the Justice Department, it
was chaired by the White House Counsel to ensure that the group would “ideologically vet[ ]
candidates for judicial office.” 124 President George H.W. Bush continued to use this screening
process, requiring nominees to submit to extensive interviews by the White House Committee on
Federal Judicial Selection. 125
Although President Clinton ceded some power over judicial nominations to the Justice
Department, creating “a joint Justice Department/White House committee ([known as] the
Judicial Selection Group),” 126 the Justice Department was involved primarily in vetting
candidates’ credentials, while the White House managed the political aspects of the process. 127
President George W. Bush returned selection power to the White House; he formed a Judicial
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Selection Committee, chaired by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, which developed lists
of potential nominees that were presented to President Bush for initial approval. 128 While the
Justice Department coordinated the investigation and vetting of candidates, interviews were
conducted in the White House. 129
Reagan centralized responsibility for judicial nominations in the White House to ensure
that his administration’s “judicial nominees were compatible with [his own] philosophical and
policy orientation.” 130 As subsequent administrations followed suit, the importance of ideology
and partisanship in the process increased. Opportunities for give-and-take or negotiations
between the president and Senators who held opposing points of view were reduced or
eliminated, and the airing of philosophical differences regarding particular nominees was pushed
back to the point at which the nominations were considered in the Senate. The contentiousness
of the process overall increased.
An additional word must be said about the phenomenon of divided government. Divided
government alone does not explain judicial appointment outcomes. Rather, it is the closeness of
the division within the Senate – not simply the fact that different parties control the White House
and the Senate – that is relevant to the analysis. 131 As Professors Law and Solum note, for
example, although in the second half of his first term and the beginning of his second term,
President George W. Bush worked with a Republican-controlled Senate, he nonetheless
encountered stiff opposition in connection with judicial nominations. 132 Similarly, although
President Clinton had a Democratic majority in the Senate during the first two years of his first
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term, he had difficulty confirming circuit court nominees. 133 Law and Solum explain President
Bush’s difficulty confirming nominees by comparing his relatively conservative philosophy with
that of the “median” Senator; in a Senate where Republicans held only a narrow majority, the
large number of relatively liberal Senators (presumably Democrats), coupled with a group of
moderate Senators (some of whom were Republicans), moved the ideological “median” to the
left, and made opposition – even filibuster – of conservative nominees more likely. 134
Thus, it is not so much party affiliation, but the relative ideological views of the president
and Senators involved in the confirmation process that matters. It is not possible to capture this
information statistically. Nonetheless, “party identification . . . conveys some rough information
about [presidential and Senatorial] ideological leanings [because,] while neither party may fit
anyone perfectly, legislators can be expected to choose their party affiliation based on the extent
to which they share the policy goals of other party members. Party membership therefore offers
an imperfect, but convenient, means of situating individual political actors relative to one another
on the ideological spectrum.” 135 This is particularly true since the ideological gap between the
Democratic and Republican parties has grown steadily wider since the time Ronald Reagan was
president.
The impact that closely divided government has on judicial nominations is perhaps best
captured by the data on roll call votes during the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush administrations. At times when there have been fewer than 49 Democratic Senators,
16.92% of judicial nominees received roll call votes. At times when there have been more than
51 Democratic Senators, only 1.52% of nominees were confirmed on a roll call vote. But in
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periods where there were 49 to 51 Democratic Senators – i.e., a closely divided chamber – the
percentage of roll call votes jumped to 43.64%. 136
The factors that have contributed to increasing contention in judicial selection in the last
twenty years are not likely to change soon. It is unlikely, for example, that the role of the lower
federal courts in deciding important social and political issues will diminish, just as it is unlikely
that interest groups will cease attempting to affect the make-up of the courts. Campaigns have
become more – not less – sophisticated in their use of elite mobilization strategies, and close
ideological and party divisions in the Senate reflect the ongoing “red-blue” make-up of the
country. As a result, and absent process reform, judicial nominations will likely remain
contentious for the foreseeable future. Before examining possible models for reform, therefore,
it is appropriate to ask whether this matters.

The Results of Contentiousness
As one observer noted, the confirmation process, at least at the Supreme Court level, has
begun to resemble “an election campaign, a media event complete with an avalanche of stump
speeches and a bombardment of negative advertising, all accompanied by extensive direct mail
advertising, campaign buttons, and solicitation of funds.” 137 Sheldon Goldman argues that it is
not yet known whether heated Supreme Court battles and contentious lower court nominations
have undermined public confidence in the courts. 138 He offers, in fact, “[a] contrarian
perspective on contentiousness, obstruction, and delay” – namely, that it reflects “Republicans
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and Democrats . . . engaged in debating public policy and the role of the judiciary,” which is
precisely the type of debate “one expects from a vibrant democracy.” 139
Whatever its impact on public perception of the impartiality and independence of the
courts, it appears clear that the contentiousness of the confirmation process has discouraged
some qualified applicants from seeking appointment. While other factors – such as workload
and low salaries – contribute, there is anecdotal evidence that the prospect of enduring a
confirmation battle has deterred qualified individuals from applying. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist raised the problem in his 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, noting that
it had become “increasingly difficult to find qualified candidates for federal judicial vacancies”
in part because of “the often lengthy and unpleasant nature of the confirmation process.” 140
Professor David Vladeck of Georgetown University Law School has commented that
“the intensively partisan nature of today's appointment process is a serious disincentive for even
the most highly qualified individuals to throw their hat into the judicial-appointment ring. Not
only does the process threaten to be emotionally bruising, but many nominees also have to place
their careers on hold for a year or more while the process grinds ahead, only to be rejected for
political reasons or to see their nominations lapse because Congress goes out of session or the
President's term expires.” 141 Brooklyn Law Professor Jeffrey Stempel has similarly observed:
Once a crowning jewel capping a distinguished career, many view appointment to
the bench as an unattractive job offering poor working conditions and inadequate
compensation. In addition, the confirmation process has become more politicized
both in terms of the ‘vetting’ of nominees, a practice that may discourage some
candidates, and the more conscious consideration of their political orientation. 142
139
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These concerns are borne out by interviews of sitting judges. Ninth Circuit Judge Richard Paez,
for example, who survived one of the lengthiest and most contentious confirmation battles in
recent memory, confirmed that he found the process personally difficult.143 Judge Carolyn Kuhl,
who declined to be re-nominated by President George W. Bush, said that she thought long and
hard about whether to allow her name to be put forward again, but decided against it because
“her husband had had it with the process,” and her continued status as a nominee led to many
awkward moments when lawyers appearing before her in state court constantly offered to lobby
Senators on her behalf. 144 Similarly, Ninth Circuit Judge William Fletcher, appointed by
President Clinton, called the process “nasty,” “dishonest,” and “distorted.” 145
Individuals seeking appointment to the bench have long known that they must open their
private lives to scrutiny during the vetting process. They often opt not to participate, however,
where there is a risk that their good name and reputation will be sullied. As Ninth Circuit Judge
Milan Smith noted, “there are people who would never think of being a judge because their
careers would be destroyed if they raised their heads above the sand.” 146
In addition to discouraging good candidates, it is clear that delays in confirming judges
have also delayed the disposition of cases and led to mounting workload pressures on judges. In
1992, more than sixty-one percent of the federal judges responding to a Federal Judicial Center
survey rated delay in filling judicial vacancies a “grave” or a “large” problem. 147 That same
year, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]here is perhaps no issue more important to the
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judiciary right now than this serious judicial vacancy problem." 148 In 1997, and again in 2001,
Chief Justice Rehnquist raised the issue in his Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary. 149
Between 1970 and 1992, the vacancy rate in the circuit courts almost doubled; the vacancy rate
in the district courts more than doubled. During this period, vacancies in the district courts
averaged 8%; they reached a high of 17% in 1992. Vacancies in the court of appeals averaged
7%. 150 Several authors attribute the vacancy problem more to executive branch delay in
nominating individuals to fill vacant judgeships than to Senate delay in confirming them. 151
While this may be true, Hennemuth and Magnum found that the wait time from vacancy to
nomination increased only 52% between 1979 and 1992, while the time from nomination to
confirmation by the Senate increased 115%. This trend shows that the increasing
contentiousness of the confirmation process is contributing to the courts’ vacancy problem in a
statistically significant way. 152
It thus appears that there are real-world negative consequences that flow from the
contentiousness present in the federal judicial selection process. To determine whether there is
any appropriate remedy for the problem, I next examine a variety of potentially relevant
selection models.

Judicial Selection Models: United States and Abroad
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In prior sections of this paper, I concluded that partisan and ideological concerns are
properly considered in making judicial selection decisions, but demonstrated that the
contentiousness of the federal judicial selection process has presently increased beyond
acceptable limits to the point that, during the study period, almost 50% of all nominations
qualified as “contentious.” 153 I also discussed why it is important, if possible, to reduce the level
of contentiousness. I now examine existing selection models to determine what, if any, lessons
they offer for reducing the level of contentiousness in the federal confirmation process.

Selection Models in the States
At present, states in the United States use one, or some combination, of four judicial
selection methods: 154 appointment by the governor; partisan election; non-partisan election; or
selection by a merit selection commission. 155 Some states use different methods for selecting
trial judges than they do when appointing appellate judges. 156 Table 15 details the variety of
judicial selection methods presently used in the states.
Table 15 – Selection Methods for Initial, Intermediate and Last Resort Courts

Merit

Partisan Election

Non-Partisan
Election

Trial

17

9

17

2

2

4

51

Intermediate

18

6

11

2

2

0

39a

153

Gubernatorial

Legislative

Combined

In more recent years, the number has exceeded 50%. During President Clinton’s second term, 52.52% of all
nominations were “contentious.” This figure declined slightly during President George W. Bush’s first term to
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Total

Last Resort
a

25

8

13

3

2

0

This number does not equal 51 because not all states have intermediate appellate courts.

SOURCE: Recreated by author from data from the American Judicature Society
As can be seen, an equal number of states presently use merit selection and nonpartisan
elections to select trial judges; a significantly smaller number use partisan elections or
appointment by the governor or legislature. The prevalence of merit selection increases at the
appellate and court of last resort levels. Although at the trial court level, the number of states
that employ merit selection is equal to the number that select judges in nonpartisan elections, the
number using merit selection increases at the intermediate appellate level, and exactly half the
states use merit selection – as opposed to one of multiple other alternatives – to select members
of the state high court. These statistics actually understate the prevalence of merit selection, as
states that are classified as executive or legislative appointment states tend to employ some form
of merit selection committee – however partisan or non-binding – to recommend candidates to
the appointing authority. The fact that these appointive systems incorporate merit selection in
some form, and that states use merit selection more than other selection mechanisms at virtually
every court level, indicates that the concept has gained legitimacy. The experience in the states,
therefore, suggests that incorporating some aspects of merit selection into the federal
appointments process would be viewed as legitimate by a majority of the public.
Certain aspects of the federal process are constitutionally mandated, of course, and would
be difficult to change. The question thus becomes whether adding certain state practices or using
them in tandem with the federal constitutional process would be effective in reducing
contentiousness. One fact that can be gleaned from the states’ experience with merit selection is
that retaining some role for the public in selecting judges is important to satisfy the public’s
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desire for accountability. It is for this reason that several states elect their trial judges but use
merit selection to appoint appellate and court of last resort judges.
Florida is an example of this pattern. Florida uses merit selection to fill vacancies on the
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals. 157 State trial judges are selected in non-partisan
elections, however, unless a majority of the voters in the jurisdiction approves merit selection
and retention as a local option. 158 Like the history of federal judicial selection reviewed earlier,
this pattern of electing trial judges demonstrates that any attempt to exclude partisan or
ideological considerations from the federal judicial selection process would not only be
unsuccessful, but be bad from a policy perspective as well. As Goldman has noted, having
presidents and Senators debate the merits of candidates’ ideology serves a legitimate function in
a representative democracy just as electing trial judges does in the states.159
It is also clear from the states’ experience that the composition of a merit selection
committee is key to the legitimacy of the appointments process. Merit selection commissions in
most states have lawyer and/or judge members as well as non-lawyers appointed by the
governor. In Missouri, for example, members of trial and appellate merit selection commissions
include a sitting judge, attorneys selected by the bar, and non-lawyers appointed by the
157
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governor. 160 The lawyer members are chosen in bar association elections and typically represent
a mix of plaintiff’s and defense attorneys. 161 The composition of the selection commissions in
Florida was similar to Missouri’s prior to 2001, in that the governor and the Florida Bar
Association appointed an equal number of members, who then selected the remaining
members. 162 As a result of legislation passed that year, however, the governor was given
authority to appoint all of the commission members. The only limitation on this power is a
requirement that lawyer members come from a list provided by the bar association. 163
In Massachusetts, there is no statutory or constitutional mandate that the governor use
merit selection commissions in making judicial appointments. All governors since 1975 have
done so, however. 164 As in Missouri and Florida, the members of the Massachusetts
commission are lawyers and non-lawyers appointed by the governor. 165 Maine governors too
have, since at least the 1990’s, voluntarily appointed a judicial selection committee to
recommend nominees for possible appointment. 166 In a break from the practice in most states,
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all members of the merit selection commission under Governor Baldacci have been practicing
lawyers. 167
Although California utilizes a hybrid system of elections and gubernatorial appointment
to select its judges, the governor retains substantial power to fill positions on the state court
bench. 168 In making appointments, the governor does not use the type of merit selection
commission found in Missouri, Florida, Massachusetts and Maine. Rather, the governor is
statutorily required to submit the names of both appellate and trial court nominees to a State Bar
commission, known as the Commission on Judicial Nominees’ Evaluation (JNE Commission),
for investigation and evaluation prior to appointment. 169 Like the commissions appointed by
governors in most other states, the JNE Commission is comprised of lawyers and non-lawyers.
Unlike these commissions, the State Bar is statutorily empowered to make the appointments. 170
The state models suggest that the public is more likely to accept the involvement of a
merit selection commission in judicial selection if it has representation from both the legal
community and the public sector. 171 To demonstrate to the public that the commission is
publicly accountable, and that the candidates it selects will not be out of the mainstream of
167
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political thought, it is also important for political officeholders to appoint at least some of the
commission members. Finally, officeholders have to buy in to the involvement of a commission
in the appointments process if it is to have any impact.
More fundamentally, it is important that elected officials retain control over the ultimate
appointment decision. In effect, merit selection commissions operate as a control on political
motivations to ensure that appointees are minimally qualified in the traditional sense (i.e., in
terms of legal knowledge, temperament and integrity). Most merit selection systems are
structured in such a way, however, that ultimately, the appointment decision is in the hands of a
politician who is accountable at election time to the public. Thus, in Missouri, the governor
appoints from three nominees submitted by the commission. 172 In Florida, the governor picks
from among three to six nominees recommended by the judicial nominating commission. 173
Both Maine’s and Massachusetts’ governors similarly retain ultimate authority to appoint
individuals to the bench. In Massachusetts, the governor appoints judges from nominees
selected by the commission, with the concurrence of the executive council, a constitutionally
authorized group that advises the governor on various types of issues. 174 In Maine, based on the
recommendations of the commission, the governor nominates judges who are appointed with the
advice and consent of the state Senate. 175
In California, the ultimate appointment decision lies even more completely with the
governor. Although obligated to solicit and consider the input of the JNE commission regarding
172
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a prospective nominee, the governor may appoint any candidate he chooses. 176 If he appoints a
candidate to the trial court who received a “not qualified” rating from the commission, however,
the State Bar may publicly disclose that fact. Additionally, a representative of the commission
testifies at the confirmation hearing of each appellate and Supreme Court justice and reveals the
rating the candidate received at that time. 177 As a result, the commission effectively serves as a
check on the governor’s appointment power in the same manner as the merit selection
commissions in Missouri and Florida, where the governor must appoint from the names
forwarded by the commission. In all three states, however, ultimate authority for the
appointments lies in the hands of an elected official. 178

Selection Models Abroad
Just as the selection methods used in the various states are instructive in evaluating
changes to the federal judicial selection process, so too it may be helpful to look to the manner in
which other common law countries appoint judges. While a comprehensive survey is outside the
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scope of this paper, I have examined judicial selection in England and Canada, with whom
America has both historic and geographic ties.
In Britain, judges were historically selected by the Lord Chancellor. 179 Working with
staff, the Lord Chancellor selected judges using a process known as “secret soundings.” 180 He
consulted confidentially with sitting members of the judiciary and senior members of the bar,
obtained their “anonymous subjective views,” and picked judges using “a mysterious system of
osmosis and grapevine.” 181 The result was a bench that comprised primarily of “male[s], from
upper-middle class families, [who were] educated in [private] schools, [were] graduates of
Oxford or Cambridge, and [were] Conservatives.” Almost all were Barristers (the most elite
members of the British legal profession) and Queen’s Counsel – “a narrow pool of lawyers with
strikingly [similar and] homogeneous backgrounds.” 182 Consequently, there was little diversity
of viewpoint, race, or gender among judicial officers. 183 The system “encourage[ed] selfreplication of the bench” because the Lord Chancellor turned to those already appointed to
advise him on new appointees. This “skew[ed] the judiciary and inhibit[ed] efforts to increase its
representativeness.” 184 It also eliminated from consideration lay advocates and solicitors, 185 who
were not known to, and/or not respected by, those advising the Lord Chancellor.
Complaints that the system lacked transparency and was elitist led to passage of the
Constitutional Reform Bill of 2005, which introduced “independent, non-governmental
179
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entit[ies]” into the appointments process. 186 These were a Supreme Court Selections
Commission, charged with selecting candidates to fill Supreme Court vacancies, and a Judicial
Appointments Commission (JAC), responsible for handling appointments to the lower courts. 187
Like the selection commissions in various states of the United States, Britain’s commissions
include judges, lawyers, and laypersons. 188 Unlike a majority of the judicial selection
commissions in the United States, however, members are not selected by the appointing
authority but rather through an “open competition” by “meticulously-structured selection
panels.” 189
Although the Lord Chancellor retains the right to reject candidates recommended by the
commission and to seek reconsideration of any particular recommendation, he cannot select a
candidate who has not been put forward by the commission. The commission structure adopted
by Britain in 2005, therefore, incorporates many of the elements present in the state judicial
selection models previously discussed– while the ultimate appointment decision rests with a
political figure, the selection commission acts as a restraint on that individual’s ability to
exercise complete and unfettered discretion in picking judges.
Another interesting aspect of the Reform Act of 2005 is its specific identification of
“merit” and “diversity” as goals of the selection process. In enacting reforms to the
186
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appointments process, Britons were concerned not so much about ensuring that appointees were
objectively qualified to sit as judges as about making the selection process more transparent and
the bench more representative of the diversity of the country. To achieve these objective, the
Reform Act states that the “[s]election must be solely on merit.” 190 At the same time, however,
the Act mandates that “in performing its functions under this Part, [the Commission] must have
regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for
appointments.” 191 To clearly establish the hierarchy between these potentially conflicting goals,
the statute makes the diversity requirement “subject to” the merit requirement. 192
These goals are surprisingly comparable to those adopted by certain of the states. In
Massachusetts, for example, the governor’s selection commission is charged with evaluating
candidates for “intellect, integrity, work ethic, judgment, temperament, experience, competence
and the demonstrated capacity and commitment to sensibly, intelligibly, promptly, impartially
and independently interpret the laws and administer justice.”193 It is also charged with ensuring
racial, gender and geographic diversity among appointees to the bench. 194 Whether nominating
commissions incorporated in the federal selection process could address more than legal
knowledge, temperament and integrity without undermining their legitimacy is unclear. Before
they could do so, there would have to be general agreement among the political participants in
the process that it was proper to take race, gender and other diversity factors into account.
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Absent such agreement, employing diversity criteria might undermine the legitimacy of the
commissions’ work. 195
Canada originally modeled its judicial selection methodology on Great Britain’s,
providing that the head of state would appoint judges with advice from the executive branch. 196
In practice, provincial trial and appellate judges are appointed by the minister of justice, with the
prime minister appointing chief justices. 197 Appointments to the federal courts are made by the
minister of justice and the prime minister, who consult with other ministers, including regional
ministers, as necessary. 198
Historically, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had complete discretion when appointing
federal judges, 199 and used that power to reward political supporters or members of their political
party. 200 Concerns about the patronage aspects of the appointments system led to modification
of the appointments process in 1988. The minister of justice created the Office of the
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs (OCFJA) to solicit applications from individuals
interested in appointment, determine whether the applicants meet minimum qualifications, and
195
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refer those who do to advisory committees in each province and territory that rate the applicants.
The members of the advisory committees are overwhelmingly lawyers and judges, although
there are some non-lawyer members as well. 201 They are appointed by the courts, bar
associations and territorial and federal officeholders. In this regard, the committees are
reminiscent of the merit selection commissions found in the several states; courts and bar
associations have some control over their membership, as do elected officeholders. Additionally,
members are both lawyers and non-lawyers.
Unlike the Lord Chancellor in Britain, and governors in certain of the states, the
Canadian minister of justice is not prohibited from appointing a candidate who has not been
recommended by the committees. Nonetheless, ministers have generally committed voluntarily
to appoint only candidates who have been recommended or highly recommended. 202 It is
important to note, moreover, that the advisory committee system is not constitutionally or
statutorily mandated and could be eliminated at any time. 203 In this respect, it provides a more
relevant model for federal judicial selection than Britain and states other than Massachusetts and
Maine. Overall, the experience in Canada demonstrates that stakeholders – most particularly, the
appointing authority – must be convinced that the public perceives a problem that requires fixing
before they will act voluntarily to limit their own discretion in selecting judges.
Having sampled existing selection models to determine what they suggest about possible
modifications to the federal process, it is now appropriate to consider a recent reform proposal
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promulgated by the American Bar Association, and thereafter to offer thoughts and
recommendations for reducing contentiousness to a level that will eliminate unnecessary delay
and return an element of bipartisanship to federal judicial appointments.

ABA Resolution 118
The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates recently adopted a resolution
proposing modifications to the existing federal judicial selection process designed to address
excessive contentiousness in the process. 204 Denise Cardman, the ABA’s Deputy Director for
Governmental Affairs, explained ABA President Tommy Wells’ decision to focus on this issue
as follows:
[S]ince the 103rd and 104th Congress, there ha[d] been . . . increased politicization . . .
more and more nominees were getting hung up having to wait for a hearing, or when
there was a hearing, there would be scathing rhetoric used against them. Instead of
members of the Senate working with the President to [identify and appoint] good
nominees, it was all about politics, what you could do to advance your nominee, or what
you could do to destroy the nominee of the other party. This created a number of
vacancies. 205
Wells wanted the ABA House of Delegates to pass a resolution that he could present to the 2008
presidential candidates for their consideration; he wanted to secure a commitment from the
candidates that they would incorporate the procedures set forth in the resolution in their judicial
selection method if elected. Wells appointed a Judicial Nomination Task Force that included
lawyers, judges and judicial appointments scholars to define the scope of the problem, and craft
modifications that would reduce contentiousness for both district and appellate nominees. 206
204
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The committee first met in January 2008. Russell Wheeler, principal author of the
resolution the task force ultimately produced, reported that members were leery about
characterizing the nature or level of partisanship in the current process because they did not want
to alienate the officeholders they were attempting to influence. Thus, neither the resolution nor
the accompanying report discusses or adopts existing proposals for reducing contentiousness
such as eliminating Senators’ blue slip right, processing nominations within a set period of time,
or foregoing roll call votes on lower court nominees. 207
The task force also made other strategic decisions to encourage political acceptance of
the proposal. It first decided not to advocate a return to the mandatory rating of candidates by
the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. President Bush announced in 2001 that
his administration would no longer send candidates’ names to the ABA for pre-nomination
evaluation and would treat the organization like other "interest groups and individual citizens,"
which are able to comment on nominees only after they have been sent to the Senate. 208 Harvey
Saferstein, a member of the task force, acknowledged that in a perfect world, “[the task force]
would [have] love[d] to have the ABA back in the process.” It ultimately concluded, however,
that such a proposal would detract from the balance of the recommendations being made. The
task force also decided to suggest that Senators establish bipartisan commissions in their states
because it believed that the commissions would encourage bipartisan input at the front end of the
process, give nominees a “good housekeeping seal of approval,” and help to ensure their
confirmation.
The product of the task force’s work was Resolution 118, a politically sophisticated
proposal that demonstrated an understanding of the complicated dynamic of judicial nominations
207
208
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under Presidents Clinton and Bush, the impact of divided government and the influence of
interest groups. Resolution 118 advanced four proposals to accelerate the confirmation process
and return control of aspects of the selection of district and circuit court nominees to home-state
Senators.
First, the resolution recommended that Senators establish bipartisan state commissions to
identify and recommend nominees for appointment in their state. 209

The task force believed

that a bipartisan committee would be particularly well situated to identify partisan or ideological
problems with potential nominees at an early stage, and thus to ensure that the most controversial
nominees did not move forward. It hoped that the bipartisan committees would vet candidates
against a set of relatively neutral, non-partisan criteria. 210 The report noted that currently
“senators in eight states . . . use[d] commissions . . . to screen potential district judge nominees”
and suggested that the use of such groups be expanded to encompass the recommendation of
nominees for the appellate courts as well. 211
Second, the resolution urged that judges be requested to announce the date on which they
plan to take senior status or resign from the bench, so that the President would have enough time
to consult with the home state Senators, and the Senators would be able to solicit input from the
bipartisan commissions. 212 The Federal Judicial Conference has already adopted a policy asking
that judges announce their “change of status” at least 12 months prior to retirement or election of
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senior status. 213 The task force underscored the importance of such notification, and noted that
many judges already provide advance notice “pursuant to the United States Judicial Conference’s
suggestion.”
Third, the resolution recommended that, in selecting circuit court nominations, the
president should “consult, before deciding on nominees, with the Senate leadership and home
state senators of both parties.” 214 Interviews with sitting judges and judicial nomination experts
indicate that this practice has rarely been followed. 215
Finally, Resolution 118 called for “expeditious action by the president and senate [on a
nomination] if a nominee passes the bipartisan commission.” According to Saferstein and
Wheeler, the task force felt that nominees who had earned a “good housing keeping seal” of
approval by securing the recommendation of a bipartisan committee should be deemed qualified
and not contentious, and be expeditiously confirmed. Wheeler also expected that the bipartisan
commissions would “weed out candidates unlikely to be confirmed.” 216
This view is borne out by experience with bipartisan commissions that operated during
the Bush administration in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, Washington
and Wisconsin. 217 Wheeler, who has studied the success of these commissions, reports that
Senators in these states had more success recommending nominees than their colleagues in non213

Federal Judicial Conference. “Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, March
18, 2003.” Pg. 20-21. <http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/marc03proc.pdf> (last visited April 15, 2009)
214
The report accompanying the resolution noted that “such consultation, far from compromising the President’s
authority to nominate judges, would serve that authority well, helping to avoid battles whose costs outweigh their
benefits to the President, the Senate, the nominees, and the courts on which they may serve.”
215
Kuhl, Carolyn. Personal Interview. 25 November 2008. Cardman, Denise. Personal Interview. 20 February 2009.
Such consultation has been the norm for district court nominations. When he was nominated to the district court, for
example, Judge Brock Hornby was one of three candidates submitted by the Maine Senators to the President for
consideration. Hornby, Brock. Personal Interview. 20 November 2008.
216
Wheeler, Russell. "Bush 2 District Court Appointees from Commission and Non Commission States." Brookings
Institute Memo, Unpublished.
217
Two of the bipartisan state commissions cited by Wheeler are no longer in existence – Pennsylvania (indeed, it is
not clear that Senators Casey and Specter ever formed a commission) and Colorado (Senator Salazar is now in the
Obama administration).

64

commission states. There are, of course, exceptions. James Rogan, a California Superior Court
Judge and a former congressman, was unsuccessfully nominated by President Bush for the
California district court after being recommended by a Judicial Advisory Committee established
jointly by President Bush and Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. 218 Rogan’s
nomination was anomalous, however; of the twenty-five candidates recommended by the
Judicial Advisory Committee in California, he was the only individual who was not confirmed.
This can be traced to unique political factors that made Rogan’s nomination controversial – in
the words of Senator Boxer’s spokesperson, “Rogan was one of the most enthusiastic backers of
impeachment – he thought President Clinton had committed high crimes and misdemeanors.” 219
Because of this, and pressure from various interest groups, Senator Boxer blocked his
nomination despite the fact that her representatives on the Judicial Advisory Committee had,
with other members, unanimously recommended his appointment.
Once passed by the ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 118 generated immediate
public debate. On August 14, 2008, the Wall Street Journal ran an op-ed entitled “The ABA
Plots a Judicial Coup.” Observing that “some bad ideas never die,” the Journal suggested that
the bipartisan commissions the ABA had recommended would simply “institutionalize the role
of home-state Senators as Presidential equals in nominating federal judges” and “steadily
218
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march[] . . . courts to the left.” 220 A Los Angeles Times editorial entitled “The ABA Way to Pick
Judges,” countered that the resolution “would improve the quality of the federal judiciary
without infringing on the constitutional prerogatives of the president or the Senate,” and would
reduce the “tiresome partisan tit-for-tat in the Senate that has blocked the confirmation of
qualified and moderate judicial nominees.” 221 The Times observed that “the vast majority of the
work done by federal judges . . . doesn’t involve hot-button social issues” and that only the
“judge's intelligence and sense of fair play, not his or her ideology” matters.
Despite the divided media attention it garnered, the ABA’s proposal was a modest one.
By limiting the recommended modifications to the creation of bipartisan commissions and
prompt action on nominees recommended by those commissions, the ABA recognized the
inherently political nature of the nomination and confirmation process. As Professor Judith
Resnik, a member of the task force, commented, the resolution was “carefully drafted” to ensure
that there would be “robust” interaction between the Senate and President. 222 It thus recognized,
and did not attempt to alter, the inherently political nature of the “advice and consent” procedure
established in the Constitution. It proposed merely to counterbalance that political give-and-take
with front-end, bipartisan consideration of potential nominees’ qualifications for judicial office.
In the section that follows, I explore whether such a proposal would effectively reduce
contentiousness in the judicial selection process, and if so, whether it goes far enough.
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The Ideal System
Any proposal to modify the process used to select federal judges must not only satisfy the
dictates of the Constitution, but the political demands of the executive and legislative branches as
well. Article II, Section 2 and Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vest certain powers
respecting judicial appointments in the executive and legislative branches; these powers must
remain with those branches absent constitutional amendment. The proposals set forth below
work within this constitutional framework and can only be implemented if the executive and
legislative branches voluntarily agree to modify the way the current selection process operates.
To determine what modifications to the current federal judicial selection process are
appropriate, one must first identify the values an ideal selection method would promote.
Paramount among these is safeguarding judicial independence and ensuring that well-qualified
individuals who would be “good” judges are appointed to the bench. 223 In order to ensure
independence and a qualified bench, the nominating process should be transparent, and involve
minimal levels of partisan gamesmanship. 224 It must be structured in such a way that both the
political branches and the public will have confidence in it.
While it is clear that partisanship and party identification properly play a role in judicial
selection, there are other criteria that are equally important – legal knowledge, integrity, judicial
temperament, and legal or judicial experience. 225 These qualities should be viewed as minimum
qualifications for judicial office. Once a candidate demonstrates that he or she is has the
requisite knowledge, temperament and integrity, partisan or ideological criteria are properly
223
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considered. Perhaps envisioning such a model, one commentator has observed that the judicial
nominating process is not so much about identifying the most qualified candidate or candidates,
as it is about weeding out those who appear to be qualified on paper, but who in fact are not. 226
In addition to ensuring the appointment of well-qualified judges, the selection process
should promote a free and independent judiciary. Judicial independence, as the Justice at Stake
campaign as described it, is the freedom “to decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on
the facts and the law. . . . [J]udges are protected from political pressure, legislative pressure,
special interest pressure, media pressure, public pressure, financial pressure, or even personal
pressure.” 227 Given our constitutional system of checks and balances, ensuring that judges are
free to decide the cases that come before them without fear of political repercussions is perhaps
the most important goal of any judicial selection method. 228 Most interviewed emphasized the
importance of judicial independence and the need to ensure that judges are able to decide cases
based on the law and the facts in the record, without reference to the political implications of
their decisions.
Some believe, however, that judicial accountability, rather than judicial independence, is
the primary objective of the judicial appointments system. Typically, individuals who hold this
view favor judicial elections rather than an appointment system. 229 At least at the federal level,
the Constitution has resolved this debate. By providing life tenure for judges and vesting power
in the courts to void the acts of the other two branches, the Founders endorsed judicial
independence, rather than judicial accountability, as the goal.
226
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To promote public confidence in the courts – a requirement if the courts are to have the
credibility necessary to maintain their independence – the appointments process must also be
transparent. Because interest groups have participated so actively in the federal judicial selection
process in recent years, and because politicians have made the issue of appointments to the bench
a rallying cry in election campaigns, information must be made available concerning the manner
in which the nominating system identifies and recruits candidates and the standards it applies to
vet and evaluate them. If this information is public, elected officials and members of the public
can assure themselves that the process is fair and that it has not been co-opted by those holding
opposing views. 230 More generally, the public can be assured that candidates are not being
“selected through ‘the old-boy system’ or some other process that has little to do with the
qualifications of the candidate.” 231
Set forth below are four proposed modifications to the current federal judicial nominating
process. Individually and in combination, these changes attempt to address some of the more
serious concerns that have been raised regarding the manner in which the process currently
operates. Adoption of some or all of these proposals would reduce the contentiousness that is
presently a hallmark of federal judicial selection, focus attention on the legal knowledge,
temperament and integrity of nominees, and increase public confidence in the process and the
judiciary. The proposals are:
•

Create a bipartisan Federal Judicial Appointment Commission (FJAC) for each circuit
comprised of individuals appointed by the President, Senators, members of the legal
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community and laypersons for all circuit court nominations, similar to the commission
President Carter created in 1977 by executive order. Secure the commitment of the
president that no individual will be nominated for a circuit judgeship unless he or she has
received at least a qualified rating from the commission. 232
•

Encourage home-state senators to work together to form bipartisan state commissions
that will vet and propose candidates for nomination for the district courts.

•

Rewrite the internal rules of the Senate to ensure that the Senate will not consider any
nominee until he or she has been vetted by the FJAC or a bipartisan state commission and
been found to be qualified or well qualified. Also, modify the Senate’s rules to ensure
that every nominee who has passed commission muster receives a Senate Judiciary
Committee hearing within a specified period of time, and preclude Senators from placing
holds on nominees.

•

Restore and maintain the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary’s role in
evaluating judicial nominees before their nominations are forwarded to the Senate.

I expand on these proposals below.
Federal Judicial Nominating Commission: To be effective and politically acceptable, a
federal judicial nominating commission must have bipartisan membership. Some of its members
must be selected by officials in the executive and legislative branches, and some must be chosen
by private individuals and/or groups. I envision a Federal Judicial Appointment Commission
(FJAC) for each circuit, with members appointed by the president, Senators of the opposing
party, bar associations and neutral civic or good government groups (e.g., the League of Women
Voters). The FJAC would have both lawyer members and non-lawyer members with significant
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background in government, public policy or community issues. 233 Much like the Federal
Elections Commission, the balance between lawyer and non-lawyer members would be worked
out by the president and the Senate.
It is critically important that members of the commission “have varied professional
experiences and backgrounds,” and be of different ethnicities and genders, to ensure diversity of
viewpoint, and thus diversity of nominees for judicial positions. 234 Much like the JAC in the
United Kingdom, the JNE Commission in California and the ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, the FJAC would rate candidates on the basis of legal experience and
credentials, integrity, and temperament. 235
The fact that some of the members of the FJAC would be appointed by the President and
by Senators of the opposing political party should make nominees more palatable to the Senate
as a whole, and, much like the bipartisan state commissions recommended by Resolution 118,
give nominees a “good housekeeping seal of approval.” Commissioners appointed by the
political branches would be attuned to the political views of their party and vet candidates with
their concerns in mind. 236 This should assure Senators that candidates at either extreme of the
233
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ideological spectrum have been weeded out, and that nominees sent up for confirmation are
generally consensus candidates rather than extreme partisans on either side. The bipartisan
nature of the FJAC would also provide political “cover” for Senators in the opposition party who
wish to support a presidential nominee. 237 Finally, the fact that the FJAC would evaluate only
appellate nominees would ensure that home-state senators retain the patronage privilege they
have now with respect to district court nominees.
Bipartisan State Commissions for District Court Nominees: 238 Similar to the manner in
which FJACs in the circuits would identify candidates for the appellate court, bipartisan
commissions in the states would identify candidates for the district court. They would use
similar criteria, and be attuned to issues that might arise during the nomination process so as to
reduce partisanship down the road. The commissions would recognize the prerogative of home
state Senators to recommend candidates for nomination and give the Senators’ favored nominees
a leg up in the public relations battle if they receive the commission’s “good housekeeping seal
of approval.”
Rules Governing Senate Consideration of Judicial Nominees: In addition to creating
commissions to evaluate, in a neutral fashion, the qualifications of candidates for judicial office,
I propose that the rules of the Senate be amended to streamline the confirmation process and

commissioners’ consideration of such matters will be informed by their knowledge of the political realities of
judicial nominations and appointments.
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ensure that, once nominated, candidates receive an up-or-down vote. Delays in considering
individual nominees have become a significant problem in recent years, as noted in the data. 239
Blue slips, holds and hearings are all matters governed by the Senate’s internal operating
rules. As a consequence, they are all things that rule changes can address. Sheldon Goldman,
who has studied the judicial nomination/confirmation process in both Democratic and
Republican administrations, has suggested that the Senate implement a “formal rule change or a
Senate resolution” to ensure that “no matter which party controls the White House and the
Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on all nominees.” 240 There is a basic
fairness to this idea. As Goldman notes, once a hearing is held, “the Committee can vote not to
recommend and even not to send the nomination to the Senate floor.” 241 The candidate,
however, will have been given an opportunity to defend his or her qualifications for judicial
appointment in an appropriate forum. 242 If the candidate is voted out of committee, there should
be further rules changes to ensure that the nominee receives a timely vote on the Senate floor.
The use of holds – secret or not – to block consideration of a nominee by the full Senate should
be prohibited as holds “subvert[ ] the constitutional directive that the Senate advise and
consent.” 243
While some have argued that Senators should be prevented from filibustering a
nomination, Goldman argues persuasively that “[i]f a sufficient number of senators choose to
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filibuster a nomination, repeated failure to obtain cloture should be recognized as a manifestation
of advice and consent.” 244 He explains:
Although it can be argued that this would turn confirmation from a simple majority to
confirmation by a supermajority – 60 votes needed to close off debate – it should be
recognized that the Constitution only mentions advise and consent, thus leaving it to the
Senate to determine how it gives that advice and consent. There is nothing in the
Constitution requiring a simple majority vote for judicial confirmation. Supporters of a
nominee who is truly controversial should have to be able to persuade 60 senators that the
nominee indeed has the judicial temperament to administer justice fairly.245
If the FJAC is operating properly, moreover, the likelihood of a filibuster should be reduced.
Restoring the Role of the ABA: The President should once again ask the ABA Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary to vet candidates before they are sent to the Senate. 246
Created during Truman’s administration, the ABA committee served for years as a check against
the nomination of unqualified candidates; for the most part, it understood and did not exceed its
limited role. It is important to have a lawyers’ organization vet the professional qualifications
and professional reputation of potential nominees, since lawyers will have the best information
regarding the professional abilities of individual candidates.
The changes proposed – creating an FJAC for appellate nominees, encouraging the
creation of bipartisan state commissions to identify and vet district court nominees, and
modifying the Senate rules – will decrease the measures of contentiousness found in the data,
and formalize examination of a nominee’s record and qualifications as a key part of the
confirmation process that is equal to, if not greater than, partisan or ideological considerations.
These changes may be difficult to achieve, especially because the only tools minority Senators
have to stop nominations they oppose are placing holds, blocking hearings and failing to return
244
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blue slips. Ultimately, however, rational people in both parties must understand that power in
the Senate shifts over time from one party to the other, and that, proverbially speaking, what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The fact that, as matters now stand, it is difficult, and
sometimes impossible, to confirm candidates at either the extreme left or extreme right of the
ideological spectrum should make it more palatable for all involved to give up some of the tools
that presently enable them to block up-or-down votes on nominees.

Conclusion
President Obama has vowed to end the “confirmation wars” that have infected the federal
judicial selection process for the past two decades. There are signs, however, that the “wars” are
about to begin anew, with interest groups and Senators gearing up for a fight over Obama’s first
nominee, David Hamilton. Even before Judge Hamilton’s nomination was announced, the
Republican Conference warned that if it was not “consulted on, and approve[d] of, a nominee
from our states, [it would] be unable to support moving forward on that nominee.” Conservative
interest groups, moreover, have been raising money to combat President Obama’s nominees for
some months. 247
Absent fundamental reform, we seem destined to continue the rancor and extend the
already substantial wait times nominees experienced during the Clinton and Bush
administrations. We may well see a repeat of 2003-2007, when Republicans controlled both the
White House and the Senate, and Democrats threatened to filibuster any nomination they felt
247
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was too extreme. Democrats made the threat largely in reaction to the “nominations hard ball”
Republicans had played Clinton’s presidency. The same tit-for-tat may play out again if
President Obama selects nominees without the concurrence of home state Republican Senators.
The idea of straight party line votes on all nominees is not outside the realm of possibility. To
the extent they are not consulted regarding home state nominees, moreover, Republican Senators
may well use blue slips, holds and even filibusters to block district court as well as circuit court
nominees. This is, in fact, is precisely what the Republican minority has threatened.
Like Republicans during the Bush administration, Democrats presently do not have a
filibuster proof majority in the Senate, and may be unable to thwart such a strategy. As the
Hamilton nomination demonstrates, moreover, interest group pressure will be brought to bear
even where a candidate has bipartisan home state support. All of these facts indicate that wait
times are likely to remain high, that vote averages will continue to decline and that any
honeymoon Obama has will be brief. Qualified candidates will continue to exercise caution
before offering themselves up for nomination, and those that are brave enough to do so may see
their reputation suffer as a result. Absent reform, the contentiousness that has marked the
confirmation process for the last twenty years will keep ratcheting up in what can only be
described as a vicious cycle.
President Obama has already taken an important step in asking the ABA to evaluate
judicial nominees before their names are sent to the Senate. 248 While this will assist in providing
solid information regarding the legal credentials and reputation of nominees, it will not reduce
248
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contentiousness, in part because the right views the ABA with suspicion. Nonetheless, President
Obama should follow this first step by continuing to seek bipartisan support for his nominees, as
he did with Judge Hamilton, by establishing a FJAC and by urging members of the Senate to
establish bipartisan commissions in their states. Members of both parties in the Senate should
explore rule changes that would work in tandem with creation of the commissions to reduce
contentiousness in the selection process.
In attempting to implement this type of reform, President Obama will have to persuade
not only Republicans, but members of his own party as well. Despite the history of bipartisan
selection in Texas – there has been a Federal Judiciary Evaluation Committee in Texas since
1986 – House Democrats from the state recently suggested that it was “their place to send names
[of potential judicial nominees] to the White House,” not that of the home state Senators, both
Republicans. 249 This drew an immediate rebuke from Senator Cornyn (R-TX), who stated that
“that the Senate [and especially the home state Senators have] a special role in any nomination
process.” 250 He noted that “when Bill Clinton was president, he negotiated with GOP senators in
states without a Democratic senator. That's what the Texas Republicans want now.” 251
Endorsing the creation of bipartisan commissions will give President Obama an opportunity to
avoid controversies such as this one, and give home state Senators who support consensus
choices cover in dealing with their base, be it left or right.
I predict that President Obama will shy away from contentious nominations fights if he
can. Ultimately, however, he is likely to nominate consensus choices for the district court, and
employ the same type of elite mobilization strategy Bush did in nominating circuit court judges
249

Gilman, Todd. “Clashes may loom on federal judge picks for Texas.” Trail Blazers Politics Blog, Dallas Morning
News. February 5, 2009. <http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/02/clashes-may-loom-on-federalju.html> (last visited April 15, 2009)
250
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who will appeal to his base. If he proceeds in this fashion, the only way to end the vicious cycle
of contentious nomination battles will be to take the steps I have outlined – create bipartisan
Federal Judicial Appointments Commissions to vet circuit judges and bipartisan state
commissions to recommend district court nominees; modify internal Senate rules to ensure that
every nominee receives a hearing after he or she has been vetted by an FJAC or bipartisan state
commission; and maintain the ABA’s role in the evaluations process. Effecting these changes
will take a substantial act of will on the part of the President and members of the Senate. It will
take quieting the frenzy of the interest groups on both sides. It will, however, be well worth it in
the end. It will encourage strong, qualified candidates to seek appointment to the federal bench.
It will reduce the chronic vacancy problem the courts have experienced, which has eroded their
ability to resolve disputes in a timely fashion. Perhaps most important, it will ensure an
independent and not overly politicized judiciary.
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ADOPTED AS REVISED
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS
SECTION OF LITIGATION
SECTION OF ANTITRUST
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
SECTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
NATIONAL LESBIAN AND GAY LAW ASSOCIATION
COALITION FOR JUSTICE
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY
COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATIONS
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
CENTER FOR RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the selection as federal judges
of men and women of diverse backgrounds and experiences, whose professional
competence, integrity, and judicial temperament, including commitment to equal justice
under law, fully qualify them to serve in the federal judiciary;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the practice of
federal judges providing advance notice of their intention to leave active federal judicial
service in order to facilitate the timely nomination of individuals to vacant judgeships;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association encourages the senators in each
state jointly and the delegates in each territory to appoint (in cooperation with others not of their
party when appropriate) bipartisan commissions of lawyers and other leaders, reflecting the
diversity of the profession and the community, to evaluate the qualifications of prospective
district judges and to recommend possible nominees whom their senators or delegate might
suggest for the President’s consideration;
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FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association endorses the use of bipartisan
commissions to consider and recommend prospective nominees for the United
States Courts of Appeals;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that the
President consult with Senate leaders of both parties and the home state senators or delegate in
advance of submitting nominations;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the President and
Senate to promptly fill judicial vacancies and act expeditiously, especially with respect to
nominees recommended by bipartisan commissions; and
FURTHER RESOLVED, That this resolution supersedes the August 1977 resolution (appended)
concerning the judicial nomination and confirmation process.
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